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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant : 
v. 
MICHAEL VON FERGUSON : Case No. 20040077-CA 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (2002). The State is appealing an interlocutory order reducing 
a charge of violating a protective order, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 
(1999), from a third degree felony to a Class A misdemeanor in Third District Court in 
and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robin W. Reese, Judge, presiding. 
A copy of the Order is in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue. Whether the trial court correctly concluded that Mr. Ferguson's prior 
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be used for purposes of enhancing his 
current charge because the State failed to sustain its burden to Mpresent[] evidence that the 
defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel/' 
Issue. Whether the trial court correctly concluded that Alabama v. Shelton. 535 
U.S. 654 (2002) stood for the proposition that Mr. Ferguson had the right to counsel 
during his prior misdemeanor conviction where he received a suspended jail term, and 
invalidated the prior uncounseled guilty plea for enhancement purposes. 
Standard of Review: These issues involve questions of law which are reviewed 
for correctness. See State v. Gomez. 2002 UT 120,111, 63 P.3d 72. 
TEXT OF RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause 
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 11, 2003, the State charged Mr. Ferguson in an amended information 
with Attempted Criminal Homicide, Murder, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 2000); Burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (Supp. 2001); Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999); and Violation of a Protective Order, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-108 (1999). On August 26, 2003, Judge 
Glenn K. Iwasaki only bound Mr. Ferguson over on the charges of attempted criminal 
2 
homicide and violation of a protective order. R. 336:88-89, 90. 
Mr. Ferguson filed a motion to quash on October 16, 2003, arguing that the State 
failed to meet its burden of establishing by "probable cause that Mr. Ferguson committed 
the crime of violation of a protective order, a third degree felony." R. 33-41. On October 
22, 2003, the State filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to quash. R. 126-
136. On October 24, 2003, the trial court held a hearing on Mr. Ferguson's motion to 
quash the bindover. R. 337. The trial court found that the State had met its burden of 
probable cause regarding the violation of the protective order charge and denied Mr. 
Ferguson's motion to quash on count I. R. 287; 337. However, the trial court granted the 
motion to quash as to count II on the enhancement. R. 287-88; 338. 
The State was granted permission to appeal the trial court's interlocutory order on 
February 18,2004. R. 329 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The preliminary hearing was held on August 26, 2003 before the Honorable 
Glenn K. Iwasaki. R. 336. The relevant facts were testified to by the State's witnesses at 
the preliminary hearing. 
On January 21, 2003, a protective order was issued prohibiting Mr. Ferguson from 
having contact with his former girlfriend, Julia Jepson. R. 221-225. The protective order 
required in part that Mr. Ferguson stay away from Ms. Jepson's place of employment, 
Brick Yard Kennels. R. 222. 
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On March 18, 2003, Mr. Ferguson was convicted of violating a protective order, a 
class A misdemeanor. R. 109-11. The judgment shows that Mr. Ferguson was not 
represented by counsel and received a suspended jail sentence of 365 days, and placed on 
probation. R. 110-11. See Addendum B. 
On March 24, 2003, Officer Sullivan of the Salt Lake City Police Department saw 
a Caucasian male whom he later identified as Mr. Ferguson on the roof of the Media Play 
store in the Brickyard Plaza. R. 336:8-13. The officer subsequently found a rifle with 
ammunition on the roof and Mr. Ferguson was arrested. R. 336:12. The Media Play store 
was in the vicinity of the workplace of Ms. Jepson. R. 336:28, 35-36. Mr. Ferguson was 
arrested and charged with three second degree felonies and one third degree felony: 
attempted criminal homicide, a second degree felony; burglary, a second degree felony; 
theft, a second degree felony; and violation of a protective order, a third degree felony. R. 
20-23. 
During the preliminary hearing, the State introduced into evidence a certified copy 
of the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment of Mr. Ferguson's prior misdemeanor 
conviction. R. 336:64. Mr. Ferguson objected to its admission for the purposes of 
enhancing the violation of a protective order charge because it showed on its face that he 
was unrepresented. R. 336:65. The trial court bound Mr. Ferguson over on the violation 
of a protective order, as a third degree felony, and attempted criminal homicide. R. 
336:88. The burglary and theft charges were subsequently dismissed at the preliminary 
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hearing. R. 336:88-89. Mr. Ferguson filed a motion to quash the bindover arguing that 
his prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be used to support the 
enhancement of the violation of a protective order charge to a third degree felony. R. 33-
41. The State opposed the motion arguing that the March 18th plea could be used for 
enhancement purposes because Mr. Ferguson was not entitled to counsel for his 
misdemeanor conviction even though 365 days of jail was imposed because he "was not 
required to serve a single day in jail as part of his sentence." R. 131-32. 
The trial court held a hearing on the motion to quash on October 24, 2003. R. 
337. At the hearing, Mr. Ferguson argued that under the recent United States Supreme 
Court decision Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), he was entitled to counsel on 
his misdemeanor conviction because the court imposed a suspended jail sentence. R. 
337:8. Mr. Ferguson further argued that because the conviction shows on its face that he 
was unrepresented he successfully rebutted the presumption of regularity and the burden 
shifted back to the State to prove he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to 
counsel. R. 337:18. The trial court agreed and determined the State had failed to sustain 
its burden of showing that Mr. Ferguson had knowingly waived his right to counsel and 
ordered the charge "amended to reflect a class A misdemeanor as opposed to a third 
degree felony." R. 338:7. The State sought and was granted permission to appeal the trial 
court's interlocutory order. R. 329. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court correctly found that Mr. Ferguson's prior uncounseled 
misdemeanor conviction could not be used to enhance his current charge absent a 
showing by the State that he knowingly waived his right to counsel. Under Burgett v. 
Texas. 389 U.S. 109 (1967) and State v. Triptow. 770 P.2d 146 (Utah 1989) a 
presumption of regularity including the presumption that a defendant was represented by 
counsel does not attach to a prior conviction which shows on its face that a defendant was 
not represented by counsel and when there is no indication that the right has been waived. 
Mr. Ferguson's prior conviction shows on its face that he appeared pro se and the record 
is silent on whether he waived his right to have counsel present. Therefore, the 
presumption of regularity did not attach to his prior conviction and it cannot be used for 
enhancement purposes absent a showing by the State that he knowingly waived his right 
to counsel. 
Even if this Court were to determine that a presumption of regularity did attach to 
the prior conviction, shifting the burden of proof to Mr. Ferguson, he successfully 
rebutted the presumption by producing "some evidence" that he was unrepresented and 
did not knowingly waive counsel. Once Mr. Ferguson had produced "some evidence," 
the burden shifted back to the State to prove that he either was represented or knowingly 
waived his right to be represented. The State failed to sustain its burden and the trial 
court correctly concluded that the conviction could not be used for enhancement 
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purposes. 
The trial court found that under Sheiton, Mr. Ferguson had the right to counsel 
unless he validly waived that right. The court correctly concluded that Sheiton does not 
stand for the proposition that a prior conviction is valid even though the suspended jail 
sentence is invalid. The state in Sheiton did not seek review of the validity of Sheiton's 
conviction, therefore, the issue was not before the Supreme Court. Sheiton 's holding 
simply confirmed a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel when sentenced to a 
suspended jail term. The reasoning in Sheiton and other Supreme Court and Utah cases 
supports that an uncounseled conviction cannot be used for enhancement purposes where 
a defendant has a right to counsel, absent a showing by the State that he knowingly waive 
that right. 
The State failed to sustain its burden in this case, therefore, the trial court correctly 
found that Mr. Ferguson's prior conviction could not be used for enhancement purposes. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT A PRIOR 
UNCOUNSELED MISDEMEANOR CONVICTION CANNOT BE USED FOR 
ENHANCEMENT PURPOSES ABSENT THE STATE SHOWING THAT 
MR. FERGUSON KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL. 
The trial court correctly determined that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
attached to the charge of violating a protective order, the class A misdemeanor Mr. 
Ferguson was convicted of on March 18, 2003 because he was sentenced to a suspended 
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jail term. See Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002) (clarifying a misdemeanor 
defendant's right to counsel when sentenced to a suspended jail term). The trial court 
concluded that Mr. Ferguson's prior conviction could not be used for enhancement 
purposes absent a showing by the State that he had knowingly waived his right to counsel 
because the face of the conviction shows he had been deprived of counsel in that 
proceeding. See Burgett 389 U.S. at 114-15 (holding certified conviction on its face 
raised presumption defendant denied right to counsel); Triptow, 770 P.2d 146 
(determining when presumption of regularity attaches to a prior conviction). The trial 
court correctly concluded that the State had the burden to prove Mr. Ferguson knowingly 
waived his right to counsel because a presumption of regularity did not attach to the 
misdemeanor conviction which showed on its face that Mr. Ferguson was not represented 
by counsel. However, even if a presumption of regularity did attach, Mr. Ferguson 
successfully rebutted the presumption when he presented "some evidence" of irregularity 
during his prior conviction. Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling. 
A. A Presumption of Regularity Does Not Attach When A Conviction Shows On 
Its Face That A Defendant Was Not Represented By Counsel. 
The supreme court held in Triptow that when a defendant is charged with an 
enhancement based on a prior conviction "the State bears the burden of proving the prior 
conviction. . . . A previous judgment of conviction so proven is entitled to a presumption 
of regularity, including a presumption that the defendant was represented by counsel." 
770 P.2d at 149. The presumption of regularity never attached to Mr. Ferguson's prior 
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conviction because the face of the conviction shows that he was not represented by 
counsel. See Burgett 389 U.S. at 114-15 (the face of the prior convictions raised 
presumption defendant was denied right to counsel); Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (establishing 
a misdemeanor defendant's right to counsel when sentenced to a suspended jail term). 
Therefore, under U.S. Supreme Court and Utah case law, the State had the burden of 
proving that Mr. Ferguson knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. 
In Burgett, the state offered a certified copy of one of the defendant's prior 
convictions for the purposes of enhancing his current charge. 389 U.S. at 112. On the 
face of the conviction it "showed that [the defendant] was not represented by counsel 
[and]. . . [t]here was no indication in the record that counsel had been waived." IcL. The 
Supreme Court began by stating that the rule established by Gideon v. Wainwright 
"making it unconstitutional to try a person for a felony in a state court unless he had a 
lawyer or had validly waived one" was "not limited to prospective applications."1 IdL at 
114.2 The Supreme Court found that "the certified records of the [prior] conviction on 
their face raise a presumption that petitioner was denied his right to counsel in the [prior] 
proceeding, and therefore that his conviction is void." IcL at 114. The Supreme Court 
]In Alabama v. Shelton, the Supreme Court recently held that a misdemeanor 
defendant sentenced to a suspended jail term has the same right to counsel guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment. 535 U.S. 654. 
2A felony defendant's right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment was 
recognized in 1963. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Burgett does not 
indicate what year the defendant was convicted of his prior offense in violation of the 
Sixth Amendment. 
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reasoned that "[presuming waiver of counsel from a silent record is impermissible. To 
permit a conviction obtained in violation of [the Sixth Amendment] to be used against a 
person either to support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense is to erode the 
principle of [Gideon]. Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction was denial of 
the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation of that Sixth 
Amendment right." kL at 114-15 (internal citations omitted). 
In Triptow, the defendant was convicted of second degree felony theft under the 
habitual criminal statute which provides for sentence enhancements. 770 P.2d at 146. 
Defendant argued, inter alia, that in addition to proving his previous conviction "the State 
had the burden of proving that he was represented by counsel when he was previously 
convicted." IcL Defendant argued that under Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S. Ct. 
1585 (1980) (overruled by Nichols v. United States. 511 U.S. 738 (1994)) and Burgett, 
the use of his prior uncounseled convictions for enhancement purposes violated his Sixth 
Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. IcL at 147. 
The supreme court began by distinguishing Baldasar and Burgett from Triptow's 
case by emphasizing that in Baldasar and Burgett "it was plain that the defendant did not 
have the benefit of counsel during the previous conviction" noting that "the record of the 
prior conviction on its face raised the presumption that the defendant was denied the right 
to counsel." Id & n3. Because of this "obviously uncounseled" conviction, it was 
unnecessary for the Supreme Court to "reach the questior ~r—*— 1 *— 1-—J c 
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pleading and proof on the question of whether the defendant is counseled." IdL at 147-48. 
Baldasar and Burgett were therefore easily distinguishable because in both cases, the 
record showed that the defendant did not have counsel. The court then analyzed State v. 
Branch, 743 P.2d 1187 (Utah 1987) where it "considered a somewhat analogous [burden 
of proof] question." Id., at 148. The supreme court stated that in Branch it "invoked what 
was in effect a presumption of the regularity of the proceedings leading to the prior 
convictions because the defendant had been represented by counsel."3 Id. (emphasis 
added). The court applied this same presumption to Triptow concluding that 
when a defendant is charged as an habitual criminal, the State bears the 
burden of proving the prior conviction, sentencing, and commitment.... 
A previous judgment of conviction so proven is entitled to a presumption 
of regularity, including a presumption that the defendant was represented 
by counsel. This presumption satisfies any initial burden the State may 
have of proving that the defendant had or knowingly waived counsel. . . . 
Id. at 1494 (emphasis added). Read together, Burgett and Triptow stand for the 
proposition that a presumption of regularity only attaches when there is nothing on the 
face of the conviction to indicate that a defendant was not represented by counsel. Only 
after the presumption of regularity attaches does the burden of proving that defendant was 
3In Branch, the supreme court stated that "an involuntary guilty plea cannot be 
used to enhance or support a subsequent conviction." 743 P.2d at 1192. However, the 
State in Branch "demonstrated that both pleas were entered with the benefit of counsel." 
Id. Therefore, the presumption of regularity attached and the burden shifted to the 
defendant to prove that the pleas were involuntary. 
4This Court reiterated that it is "a plea entered with the benefit of counsel [that] is 
'presumed to have been voluntary' absent evidence demonstrating lack of voluntariness." 
State v. Gutierrez. 2003 UT App 95,1}8, 68 P.3d 1035 (emphasis added). 
11 
not represented by counsel and did not knowingly waive counsel shift to the defendant. 
Triptow, 770 P.2d at 149. The State acknowledged this burden of proof at the motion to 
quash hearing. See R. 337:16-17. Hence, the presumption of regularity did not attach in 
this case because it was obvious from the face of the record that Mr. Ferguson did not 
have the benefit of counsel and the record is silent on whether he waived his right to 
counsel. 
At the motion to quash hearing, defense counsel pointed out that the face of the 
conviction showed that Mr. Ferguson appeared "pro se" on March 18, 2003 and pled 
guilty to the charge of violation of a protective order, a class A misdemeanor. R. 110-
111. In addition, the record is silent on whether Mr. Ferguson was advised of his right to 
counsel and whether he in fact waived that right. R. 110-111; sjee. Burgett 389 U.S. at 
114-15 (stating it is impermissible to presume waiver of counsel from a silent record). 
The State acknowledged that Mr. Ferguson's prior conviction was uncounseled and that 
Utah case law "seems to say that when that docket says the defendant was pro se, the State 
then needs to present evidence that he knowingly gave up his right to Counsel." R. 
337:16. However the State argued that it was unnecessary to go through this analysis 
regarding waiver of counsel because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not attach 
during the March 18 th hearing since Mr. Ferguson was sentenced only to suspended jail 
sentence. R. 130, 337:16. The following colloquy then took place between the trial court 
and the State: 
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THE COURT: Well, I suppose - - would you agree, then, with Ms. 
Trease, that if this Shelton case stands for the proposition that the jail was 
imposed, even if it's suspended, a person is entitled to an attorney 
appointed if they can't afford one, then Mr. Von Ferguson was entitled to 
an attorney before Judge Medley and one wasn't appointed, or if there 
isn't some proof that he knowingly waived that right, then he would be 
entitled only to have the charges Class A misdemeanor? 
THE STATE: Absolutely. He (inaudible) a full year suspended on him. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
THE STATE: If the (inaudible) jail, whether suspended or not, that the State 
would need to come and prove that he willingly waived his right to Counsel. 
R. 337:16-17 
As the record indicates, the state agreed with the trial court that if Shelton stood 
for the proposition that a defendant is entitled to the appointment of an attorney when a 
suspended jail sentence is imposed then it would have the burden to "prove that he 
willingly waived his right to Counsel." R. 337:17. 
In sum, under Triptow, the presumption of regularity including the "presumption 
that defendant was represented by counsel" does not attach because, like the record of 
conviction in Burgett, it was plain from the face of the conviction that Mr. Ferguson "did 
not have the benefit of counsel during his previous conviction" and there is no indication 
from the record of conviction that he was advised or waived his right to counsel. 
Triptow, 770 P.2d at 147; Burgett, 389 U.S. at 114-15. Because the presumption of 
regularity never attached, the trial court correctly determined that the State was not 
relieved of its burden of proving that Mr. Ferguson had or knowingly waived counsel. 
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The State failed to sustain its burden of proof, therefore, the trial court correctly 
determined that Mr. Ferguson's uncounseled misdemeanor plea could not be used to 
enhance the current charge against him. Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial 
court's ruling. 
B. Even If The Court Determines That The Burden Shifted To Mr. Ferguson, He 
Produced "Some Evidence" That He Was Unrepresented and Did Not Knowingly 
Waive Counsel 
After the State satisfies its initial burden, a presumption of regularity attaches and 
the burden shifts to the defendant to "produce some evidence that he or she was not 
represented by counsel and did not knowingly waive counsel." Triptow, 770 P.2d at 149 
(emphasis added). Even if this Court determines that the State satisfied its initial burden 
and a presumption of regularity attached, Mr. Ferguson successfully rebutted the 
presumption thereby shifting the burden back to the State. 
"[W]hen a defendant has offered evidence of a denial of right to counsel in the 
absence of a knowing waiver, 'the presumption of regularity is rebutted and the burden 
shifts to the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was in 
fact represented or knowingly waived representation'" In re Smith. 925 P.2d 169, 173 
(1996) (quoting Triptow, 770 P.2d at 149. In re Smith, a case the State fails to 
acknowledge in its opening brief, the supreme court determined that the appellant, Smith, 
had successfully rebutted the presumption of regularity shifting the burden back to the 
State to prove that the appellant knowingly waived his right to counsel. 925 P.2d at 173. 
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Smith appealed "from a summary judgment that his Wisconsin convictions . . . subject 
him to disciplinary action by the Utah State Bar." IcL at 170. During proceedings in the 
trial court, the prosecutor introduced a copy of Smith's previous Wisconsin conviction. 
Id. at 172. Smith argued that his Wisconsin conviction was void and "not eligible for full 
faith and credit in Utah" because he was denied the right to counsel. IcL The supreme 
court indicated that, in this case, the introduction of the previous conviction shifted the 
burden to Smith to "produce some evidence that he . . . was not represented by counsel 
and did not knowingly waive counsel." IcL In his "attempt[] to do this," Smith pointed to 
the record which indicated that "his original counsel withdrew." IcL The record also 
indicated that after granting several continuances allowing for Smith to retain new 
counsel "the court refused to further delay the trial and required him to proceed on his 
own." IcL at 173. After Smith presented this evidence, the supreme court indicates that 
the burden shifted back to the State to show that Smith "was in fact represented or 
knowingly waived representation." IcL at 173. In re Smith, "the prosecution met its 
burden of showing that Smith knowingly waived his right to counsel" based on the facts 
in the record surrounding the Wisconsin conviction. IcL 
In Gutierrez, the defendant was charged with driving under the influence of 
alcohol and/or drugs (DUI) with prior convictions enhancing the DUI charge from a class 
B misdemeanor to a third degree felony. 2003 UT App 95 at [^2. Gutierrez filed a motion 
to dismiss the enhancement arguing that he was denied the assistance of counsel during 
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his prior misdemeanor guilty pleas. Id. In an effort to rebut the presumption of regularity 
that attached to the prior guilty plea, Gutierrez produced only a ffself-serving affidavit" 
where he claimed, inter alia, that the judge did not inform him of his right to counsel. Id_ 
at 1fl|9-l0. This Court determined that a self-serving affidavit was insufficient "to 
overcome the presumption of regularity established in Triptow," stating "[a] defendant 
must demonstrate the involuntariness of his plea by some evidentiary method other than 
his own bare assertions." Id at % 12. Instead, "a defendant seeking to rebut the 
presumption of regularity must produce a transcript, testimony regarding taking of the 
plea, a docket sheet, or other affirmative evidence." Id. at^jll. 
In this case, a certified copy of Judgment, Sentence and Commitment of Mr. 
Ferguson's prior conviction was submitted as evidence to the trial court. R. 336:64. Mr. 
Ferguson pointed out that his prior conviction clearly identifies that he appeared "pro se" 
and was unrepresented by counsel during the March 18th guilty plea and sentencing 
hearing. R. 336:65. The conviction also did not contain any notations or make reference 
to whether Mr. Ferguson was advised of or waived his right to counsel. R. 110-11. 
Therefore, Mr. Ferguson produced "some evidence" rebutting the presumption of 
regularity. 
The State cites Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992), as support for its argument 
that a presumption of regularity is not rebutted by evidence specifically indicating that a 
defendant appeared pro se or from a record silent on the issue of whether a defendant was 
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advised or waived his right to counsel. See Appellant Brief 15-16. However Parke does 
not stand for such a broad proposition. Parke concerned the "narrow question" of whether 
Kentucky's burden of proof scheme, violated due process.5 Id at 28. The defendant was 
charged "with robbery and with being a persistent felony offender in the first degree." Id_ 
at 23. The state presented certified copies of the defendant's two prior convictions for 
burglary. Id at 24. In addition, the state presented evidence consisting of a "Plea of 
Guilty" form signed by the defendant and his attorney in one of the prior convictions. Id. 
(emphasis added). The defendant also "acknowledged signing a form [in the second 
conviction] that specified the charges to which he agreed to plead guilty . . . [and] 
admitted that the judge had at least advised him of his right to a jury trial." Id_ at 25. The 
defendant moved to suppress these prior convictions arguing that "imposing even a 
burden of production on him is fundamentally unfair" when a waiver of his Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment rights are in question. Id_ at 31. The defendant further argued that 
because there were no transcripts of the plea proceedings in the record, the record could 
not affirmatively show that his guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. Id_ at 23. 
5Under Kentucky's recidivism statute the state must "prove only the fact of a 
previous conviction . . .not [whether] that. . . conviction was validly obtained." Id . at 
523. "Once this is done, a presumption of regularity attaches, and the burden shifts to the 
defendant to produce evidence that his rights were infringed or some procedural 
irregularity occurred in the earlier proceeding. If the defendant refutes the presumption 
of regularity, the burden shifts back to the government affirmatively to show that the 
underlying judgment was entered in a manner that did, in fact, protect the defendant's 
rights." Id at 24. 
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While the Supreme Court acknowledged that recidivism statutes "have a long 
tradition in this country" and have been "repeatedly upheld/' the Court also noted that 
"uncounseled convictions cannot be used 'against a person either to support guilt or 
enhance punishment for another offense.'" IcL_ at 26-27. Furthermore, "[i]t is beyond 
dispute that a guilty plea must be both knowing and voluntary." Ijl_ at 28. '"The standard 
was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the 
alternative courses of action open to the defendant.5" IdL. at 29 (citation omitted). 
However, a presumption of regularity attaches to final judgments and the Court 
determined "[t]here [was] no good reason to suspend the presumption" in the Parke case 
because he had counsel. Id. at 30. The reasoning behind the Court's determination was 
that Parke was not a case where the actual "transcript [was] suspiciously 'silent' on the 
question whether the defendant waived constitutional rights." IdL Rather, there were no 
actual transcripts or records at all of the prior plea colloquies which apparently is not 
unusual "when the prior conviction is several years old." IdL Because "Boykin6 
colloquies have been required for nearly a quarter century" the Supreme Court did not 
think it was logical to conclude when collaterally reviewing a conviction that the "mere 
unavailability of a transcript (assuming no allegation that the unavailability is due to 
governmental misconduct) [presumptively meant] that the defendant was not advised of 
his rights." Id. 
6See Bovkin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). 
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The defendant then tried to argue that Burgett stood for the proposition that "every 
previous conviction used to enhance punishment is 'presumptively void' if waiver of a 
claimed constitutional right does not appear from the face of the record." Id. at 31. The 
Supreme Court distinguished Burgett in two ways. First, the Court noted that at the time 
of Burgett's previous conviction "state criminal defendants' federal constitutional right to 
counsel had not yet been recognized, and so it was reasonable to presume that the 
defendant had not waived a right he did not possess." IcL However, the Supreme Court 
noted that the Boy kin rules have now been required for almost a quarter century. Id. at 
30. In addition, the record was not silent on the matter of waiver as it was in Burgett; but 
instead the record did not exist at all. Id. "If raising a Boykin claim and pointing to a 
missing record suffices to place the entire burden of proof on the government, the 
prosecution will not infrequently be forced to expend considerable effort and expense 
attempting to reconstruct records from farflung States where procedures are unfamiliar 
and memories unreliable. . . .[Therefore], [i]n light of the relative positions of the 
defendant and the prosecution in recidivism proceedings, we cannot say that it is 
fundamentally unfair to place at least a burden of production on the defendant."7 Id. at 32. 
"We have little doubt that serious practical difficulties will confront any party assigned an 
7The Supreme Court noted that states can and do allocate the burdens of proof 
differently. Id at 32. Some states place the entire burden on the prosecution while 
others assign the entire burden to defendants after the state has established the fact of the 
conviction. Id. at 33. 
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evidentiary burden in such circumstances" but "[t]he Due Process Clause does not, 
however, require a State to adopt one procedure over another on the basis that it may 
produce results more favorable to the accused." IcL The Supreme Court held that 
Kentucky's allocation of the burden of production to the defendant did not violate due 
process. Id at 34. 
As indicated, Parke concerned the allocation of burdens and does not stand for the 
proposition that the presumption of regularity is not rebutted by evidence specifically 
indicating that a defendant appeared pro se or from a record silent on the issue of whether 
a defendant was advised or waived his right to counsel. In fact, the Supreme Court's 
rationale in distinguishing Burgett bolsters Mr. Ferguson's argument that a presumption 
of regularity never attached to his prior conviction. See supra Point A. The Supreme 
Court distinguished Burgett from the Parke case because missing records of a plea 
colloquy are not the same as records that are silent on whether a defendant waived 
constitutional rights. Moreover, unlike Parke where the Boykin rule had been well-
established for nearly a quarter century, at the time of Burgett's prior conviction "state 
criminal defendants' federal constitutional right to counsel had not yet been recognized, 
and so it was reasonable to presume that the defendant had not waived a right he did not 
possess." IcL at 31. The State interprets this to mean that because Shelton, which 
established a misdemeanor defendant's right to counsel when given a suspended sentence, 
was decided 10 months before Mr. Ferguson pled guilty on March 18, 2003, it should be 
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presumed "he enjoyed the right to counsel." See. Appellant's Brief 16. A simple review 
of the trial court record illustrates that far from enjoying a "well-established" right to 
counsel, Shelton's rule was unknown to both the State and the trial court. 
During the preliminary hearing, the State sought to introduce into evidence Mr. 
Ferguson's March 18th prior uncounseled guilty plea. The defendant objected arguing 
that the document shows on its face that Mr. Ferguson appeared pro se, therefore this 
"unrepresented conviction may not be used" for enhancement purposes. R. 336:64-65. 
The State responded that it had researched the matter and found the that "[t]he law in Utah 
is to the contrary." R. 336:65. Mr. Ferguson then filed a motion to quash arguing again 
that his prior uncounseled conviction could not be used to support an enhancement. R. 
36-41. The State responded, arguing that the prior uncounseled conviction could be used 
for enhancement purposes "[bjecause the Defendant is not entitled to counsel for a 
misdemeanor conviction unless his sentence included jail." R. 130-135. The district 
court held a hearing on the motion. R. 337. During the hearing, Mr. Ferguson argued 
that under Shelton he was "entitled to an attorney if a jail sentence is imposed . . . and 
suspended." R. 337:8-9. The State was not aware of the Shelton holding stating "[m]y 
research pulled up Nichols, and that was the most recent case that I had found." R. 
337:14-15. Therefore, the State argued that because Mr. Ferguson's jail term was 
suspended he was not entitled to counsel. R. 337:15-17. The court took the matter under 
advisement statins it would "like an opportunity to read the Shel[t]on case." R. 337:19. 
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The court then stated "[b]ecause I also agree that before the State would have to show that 
Mr. Ferguson waived his right to Counsel, there would have to be some showing that he's 
entitled to Counsel. If he wasn't entitled to Counsel before Judge Medley, then the State 
wouldn't have to show that he waived it, but I think that that very well may be, Ms. Cook, 
that if jail sentence was imposed and suspended under Utah law, he may be entitled to 
Counsel." R. 337:20. 
The record shows that neither the trial court nor the State were aware of a 
defendant's right to counsel unless he was actually sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 
Because the record affirmatively shows that the court and State were unaware that the 
Shelton case existed, this Court should not "presume" that the plea taking court complied 
with Shelton. Moreover, if Parke were to be interpreted to mean that despite an explicit 
notation on the conviction that defendant appeared pro se and silence on whether he 
waived his right to counsel it should nevertheless be "presumed [the court] complied] 
with all legal requirements" then it would in effect create an irrebuttable presumption. 
Absent a specific notation on the docket or conviction that the justice court judge did not 
advise a defendant of his right to counsel it would be virtually impossible to rebut the 
presumption of regularity. However, this Court has determined that a defendant need 
only come forward with "some evidence" to rebut the presumption of regularity. 
Under the supreme court's analysis in In re Smith and this Court's analysis in 
Gutierrez, a copy of the Judgment, Sentence and Commitment explicitly stating Mr. 
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Ferguson appeared pro se and the lack of any notation that he was advised of his right or 
waived it is enough to rebut the presumption of regularity on a prior conviction. See In re 
Smith, 925 P.2d at 172-73 (finding appellant had successfully rebutted the presumption of 
regularity shifting the burden back onto the State to prove right to counsel was validly 
waived); Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95 at ^ [7 (to rebut presumption of regularity defendant 
must produce "some evidence" he was not represented and did not knowingly waive 
counsel); Triptow, 770 P.2d at 149 (same). Once Mr. Ferguson had produced "some 
evidence" by way of the Judgment, Sentence, Conviction, the burden shifted back to the 
State to "prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was in fact 
represented or knowingly waived representation." Id. The State failed to prove its burden 
and the trial court correctly concluded that Mr. Ferguson's prior conviction could not be 
used for enhancement purposes. R. 338:6. 
Therefore, this Court should affirm the trial court's ruling striking the 
enhancement to the charge of violation of a protective order. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT 
SHELTON DOES NOT STAND FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT A PRIOR 
CONVICTION IS VALID EVEN THOUGH THE SUSPENDED JAIL 
SENTENCE IS NOT. 
The trial court determined that under Shelton, Mr. Ferguson was entitled to 
counsel when sentenced to a suspended jail term on his prior misdemeanor conviction. R. 
288; 338:6. The court disagreed with the State's argument that despite the fact that Mr. 
Ferguson had the right to an attorney during his prior conviction, "Shelton only 
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invalidates the jail sentence given pursuant to an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, 
and does not impact the conviction itself." Appellant Brief 9; R. 288. The State contends 
that the trial court erred in rejecting its interpretation. The State argues that because the 
Supreme Court only invalidated Shelton's sentence, the case necessarily means that the 
conviction is valid and can be used for enhancement purposes. However, the State's 
interpretation of Shelton is too broad and ignores the Supreme Court's reasoning and case 
precedence disallowing the use of uncounseled convictions in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment for enhancement purposes. 
The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 
shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S. Const, 
amend. VI; see also Utah Const, art. I, §12. In Gideon, 372 U.S. at 335, the Supreme 
Court "established the rule that the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment 
was applicable to the States by virtue of the Fourteenth [Amendment], making it 
unconstitutional to try a person for a felony in a state court unless he had a lawyer or had 
validly waived one." Burgett 389 U.S. at 114; State v. Heaton. 958 P.2d 911,917 (Utah 
1998). In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S. Ct. 2006 (1972), the Supreme Court 
clarified its holding in Gideon that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is violated when a defendant is "imprisoned for any offense, 
whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by 
counsel." IcL at 37. "Under [this] rule . . . every judge will know when the trial of a 
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misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits 
it, unless the accused is represented by counsel." Id. at 40; see also Scott v. Illinois. 440 
U.S. 367, 99 S. Ct. 1158 (1979) (holding that "no indigent criminal defendant be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to 
assistance of appointed counsel in his defense"). The Supreme Court's recent holding in 
Shelton simply reiterated the importance of the right to counsel, and clarified that such 
right attaches to a misdemeanor defendant any time an actual or suspended jail sentence is 
imposed. Shelton, 535 U.S. at 672. 
In Shelton, Alabama only sought review of the Alabama Supreme Court's 
invalidation of the defendant's suspended sentence but did not challenge the state court's 
affirmation of the defendant's conviction. IJL "The framing of the question presented has 
significant consequences,. .., because under [the Supreme] Court's Rule 14.1(a), 'only 
the questions set forth in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the 
Court. . . .'" "[W]e ordinarily do not consider questions outside those presented in the 
petition for certiorari." Yee v. Escondido. 503 U.S. 519, 535 (1992). Therefore, the 
Supreme Court "confine[d] its review" only to determining whether "the Sixth 
Amendment right to appointed counsel, as delineated in Argersinger and Scott, applies to 
a defendant" who is sentenced to a suspended jail term for a misdemeanor conviction. IcL_ 
at 658. "Satisfied that Shelton [was] entitled to appointed counsel at the critical stage 
when his guilt or innocence of the charged crime [was] decided and his vulnerability to 
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imprisonment determined" [Id at 674], the Supreme Court held that "a suspended 
sentence that may 'end up in the actual deprivation of a person's liberty' may not be 
imposed unless the defendant was accorded 'the guiding hand of counsel' in the 
prosecution for the crime charged." IcL at 658 (quoting Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40). Far 
from the State's contention that the Court's failure to address Shelton 's underlying 
conviction means that it is valid, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Shelton and prior case 
law show that a misdemeanor conviction taken in violation of the Sixth Amendment is 
invalid. 
Similar to the State's attempts in this case, amicus in Shelton attempted to align its 
case with Nichols v. U.S., 511 U.S. 738 (1994). The Shelton Court began distinguishing 
Nichols' on its facts. 535 U.S. at 663. The question presented in Nichols was "whether 
the Sixth Amendment barred consideration of a defendant's prior uncounseled 
misdemeanor conviction in determining his sentence for a subsequent felony offense." Id. 
During Nichols' prior uncounseled conviction he was "fined but not incarcerated " for 
driving under the influence. IdL. (emphasis added). The Nichols' Court held that "'an 
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no prison term was 
imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction.'" Id. 
(quoting Nichols, 511 U.S. at 749) (emphasis added). A conviction validly imposed 
under Scott is one in which a defendant is not sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless 
afforded the right to the assistance of appointed counsel. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 374. The 
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Shelton Court reasoned that because Nichols' uncounseled misdemeanor conviction was 
"valid when imposed," since he was only fined and not incarcerated, it "did not later 
become invalid because it was used to enhance." Id_ at 664. The Court also reasoned that 
in Nichols it applied "a 'less exacting5 standard 'consistent with the traditional 
understanding of the sentencing process" where past criminal conduct can be considered. 
Id. at 665. However, "[t]hat relaxed standard has no application in [a] case, where the 
question is whether the defendant may be jailed absent a conviction credited as reliable 
because the defendant had access to 'the guiding hand of counsel.'" Id_ (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). This distinction is relevant in Mr. Ferguson's case because his prior 
conviction cannot be "credited as reliable" absent a showing that he waived his right to 
"the guiding hand of counsel." 
Finally, in rejecting the amicus' argument that appointment of counsel should only 
be required at "the probation revocation stage, when incarceration is imminent," the 
Court's reasoning further suggests that a prior uncounseled conviction is in fact invalid 
when a suspended sentence is imposed without the assistance of counsel. 
We think it plain that a hearing so timed and structured cannot compensate 
for the absence of trial counsel, for it does not even address the key Sixth 
Amendment inquiry: whether the adjudication of guilt corresponding to 
the prison sentence is sufficiently reliable to permit incarceration. 
Deprived of counsel when tried, convicted, and sentenced, and unable to 
challenge the original judgment at a subsequent probation revocation 
hearing, a defendant in Shelton's circumstances faces incarceration on a. 
conviction that has never been subjected to 'the crucible of meaningful 
adversarial testing.' 
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LI at 667. 
This reasoning demonstrates that a conviction obtained in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment is not reliable or valid because it "has never been subjected to 'the crucible of 
meaningful adversarial testing.'" Id. This conclusion is in line with precedent from other 
U.S. Supreme Court and Utah case law establishing that a conviction obtained in violation 
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot be used to enhance or support a 
subsequent conviction. Burgett, 389 U.S. 109; Nichols, 511 U.S. at 743 n9; Branch, 743 
P.2d at 1192 (citation omitted); Triptow, 770 P.2d 146; Gutierrez. 2003 UT App 95 at f7. 
The Supreme Court has already determined that "[t]o permit a conviction obtained in 
violation of [the Sixth Amendment right to counsel] to be used against a person either to 
support guilt or enhance punishment for another offense is to erode the principle of 
[Gideon]. Burgett, 389 U.S. at 115 (internal citation omitted); see Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 
(establishing the same Sixth Amendment principle for misdemeanor defendants when 
sentenced to a suspended jail term).8 "Worse yet, since the defect in the prior conviction 
was denial of the right to counsel, the accused in effect suffers anew from the deprivation 
of that Sixth Amendment right." I(L 
The Shelton holding simply confirmed a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to 
8The State attempts to draw a distinction between felony and misdemeanor right to 
counsel cases, however, Shelton's holding affirming a misdemeanor defendant's same 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel when sentenced to a suspended sentence makes such a 
distinction erroneous. 
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counsel when sentenced to a suspended jail term. An uncounseled conviction, regardless 
of whether it is for a misdemeanor with a suspended sentence or a felony, cannot be used 
for enhancement purposes where a defendant has a right to counsel absent a showing that 
he knowingly and voluntarily waived that right. Such a conviction is invalid under Scott 
and unreliable for enhancement purposes because it "has never been subjected to 'the 
crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.'" Shelton, 535 U.S. at 667. 
Furthermore, under Burgett and Triptow, the conviction the State submitted was 
not entitled to "a presumption of regularity" including "a presumption that [Mr. Ferguson] 
was represented by counsel" because the face of the conviction indicated that 
Mr. Ferguson did not enter his plea with the benefit of the guiding hand of counsel but 
appeared pro se. The conviction was also silent on whether he waived his right to 
counsel. Burgett. 389 U.S. at 114-15; Tnptow, 770 P.2d at 149; Gutierrez. 2003 UT App 
95 at ^8. Therefore, the presumption never attached. If despite this obvious irregularity, 
the Court concludes that the State was still entitled to the presumption, Mr. Ferguson 
presented some evidence that he did not have counsel and did not knowingly waive 
counsel, shifting the burden back to the State. In re Smith, 925 P.2d at 173; Tnptow., 770 
P.2d at 149; Gutierrez, 2003 UT App 95 at f7. It then became the State's burden to show 
by a preponderance of the evidence that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his Sixth 
Amendment right. The trial court correctly concluded that the State had failed to sustain 
its burden and struck the enhancement. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Ferguson respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the trial court's ruling. 
SUBMITTED this 11**- day of August, 2004, 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
VERNICE S. TREASE 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
MICHAEL VON FERGUSON, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 031902097 
Judge ROBIN W. REESE 
The Defendant's Motion to Quash the Bindover having come before this Court for 
hearing in the above entitled matter on October 24th, 2003, and November 3rd, 2003, in 
which Defendant was represented by counsel, Vernice Trease, and the State was 
represented by counsel, B. Kent Morgan and Alicia H. Cook, the Court having fully 
considered the written memoranda and oral arguments of counsel, this Court now enters 
its FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 18th, 2003, the defendant pled guilty to violating a protective order, a 
class A misdemeanor, before Judge Medley in District Court case number 
031901111, and was sentenced to 365 days in jail. The defendant was not 
represented by counsel when he entered his plea. The jail sentence was 
suspended in its entirety and the defendant was placed on probation. 
2. On March 26th, 2003, the State filed an information alleging that the defendant 
had committed Attempted Homicide, Violation of a Protective Order, Burglary, 
and Theft of a Firearm. The protective order violation was enhanced to a third 
degree felony based on the defendant's prior conviction in case number 
031901111. 
3. A preliminary hearing was held on August 26th, 2003, before Judge Iwasaki. The 
State presented evidence that the defendant, while carrying a loaded rifle, had 
climbed onto the roof of a building neighboring the victim's workplace. The 
State also offered a certified copy of the prior conviction to support the enhanced 
protective order violation. Defense counsel objected to the use of the prior 
conviction, and argued that an uncounseled plea could not be used to enhance a 
subsequent offense. The Court overruled the objection and at the conclusion of 
the hearing found sufficient probable cause to bind over the Attempted Homicide 
and Protective Order Violation charges. 
4. On October 16th, 2003, counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Quash the 
Bindover. The defense argued that the defendant's prior uncounseled 
misdemeanor conviction could not be used to enhance the subsequent offense, and 
urged the Court to strike the enhancement. The defense also argued that the 
evidence presented at the preliminary hearing failed to establish that the defendant 
had actually violated the protective order. 
5. This Court heard oral arguments on October 24 , 2003. At the conclusion of the 
arguments, the Court requested that counsel brief the application of Alabama v. 
Shelton to the instant case, and scheduled further arguments for November 3r , 
2003. 
6. During the November 3ld hearing, counsel for the State argued that Shelton 
prohibits the imposition of a suspended jail sentence given to a misdemeanor 
defendant who did not have counsel, but does not invalidate the underlying 
conviction for purposes of enhancing future crimes. Counsel for the defendant 
argued that, whenever a suspended jail sentence is given to a misdemeanor 
defendant, Shelton does not permit the use of that conviction for enhancement. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The defense's motion to quash the bindover for insufficient evidence is denied. 
The State met its burden at the preliminary hearing of showing probable cause 
regarding the Violation of a Protective Order charge. The defendant's efforts to 
commit homicide against the victim also constitute a violation of the protective 
order, which prohibits the defendant from committing or attempting to commit 
acts of violence against the victim. 
2. The defense's motion to quash the bindover of count II as a third degree felony is 
granted. The Court agrees with the defense that under Alabama v.Shelton, a 
defendant facing a misdemeanor charge is entitled to counsel when a jail sentence 
is rendered, regardless of whether the sentence is suspended or actually imposed. 
Defendant Ferguson did not have counsel at the time he entered his guilty plea 
and received a suspended sentence, therefore the prior conviction cannot be used 
tc mha -Q count II unless the State presents evidence that the defendant 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The Court disagrees with 
the State's argument that Shelton only invalidates the jail sentence given pursuant 
to an uncounselled misdemeanor conviction, and does not impact the conviction 
itself. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the enhancement to count II is stricken, and 
count II stands as a class A misdemeanor. 
DATED this _ ^ _ day of January, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
X 
V. s\ 
0 .- / l 
AM 
Judge ROBIN W. REESE 
Approved as to form: 
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CHANGE OF PLEA 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case NO: 031901111 MO 
Judge: TYRONE E MEDLEY 
Date: March 18, 2 003 
PRESENT 
Clerk: tinaa 
Prosecutor: FROST, JANICE L 
Defendant 
Defendant pro se 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: February 3, 1955 
video 
Tape Number: 9.21 
CHARGES 
1. VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE ORDER - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 03/18/2003 {Guilty Plea} 
CHANGE OF PLEA 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of VIOLATION OF PROTECTIVE 
ORDER a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term 
of 365 day(s) The total time suspended for this charge is 365 
day(s). 
Credit is granted for time served. 
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Case No: 031901111 
Date: Mar 18, 2003 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Violate no laws. 
Defendant is not to coiranit any other violations. Complete LDS 
substance abuse program by 4/14/03. Fine to be paid by 7/1/03 






Page 2 ( l a s t ) 
